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1. Introduction 
The 2008 Financial Crisis has intensified the debate on fair value accounting. 
As certain markets became illiquid during 2008, preparers of financial 
statements experienced serious difficulties in measuring the fair value of their 
financial instruments (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2008; IASB 
Expert Advisory Panel 2008). Fair value estimates based on valuation models 
with unobservable inputs (i.e., Level 3) are difficult to verify (Ryan 2008; FASB 
2008; FASB 2009). Therefore, Level 3 fair values provide substantial 
measurement leeway for the management. Although Level 3 assets or liabilities 
are not the major balance sheet positions of banks, gains and losses on Level 3 
positions are economically relevant, as documented by the mean Level 3 income 
relative to equity of –1.2 percent and its standard deviation of 4.0 percent (see 
descriptive results in Section 4). 
To date, empirical evidence on discretionary measurement of fair values is 
limited. Dechow et al. (2010) show that financial institutions use fair value gains 
or losses from asset securitization to smooth earnings. However, their findings 
might alternatively be attributable to real earnings management or a mechanical 
negative relation rather than discretion in fair value estimates (Barth and Taylor 
2010). Recent value relevance research finds a lower valuation for “mark-to-
model” fair values (Kolev 2009; Goh et al. 2009; Song et al. 2010). However, 
these tests on value relevance cannot distinguish whether Level 3 fair values are 
opportunistically overstated or whether investors apply a discount to the 
illiquidity of Level 3 assets during the crisis (Laux and Leuz 2010, p. 110).  
This paper investigates whether banks use discretion in Level 3 fair value 
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estimates to manage earnings during the 2008 Financial Crisis, thereby shifting 
the focus from market perceptions to discretionary reporting outcomes. We 
select the crisis as the investigation period because (i) the market turmoil 
provides both measurement uncertainties and strong incentives for earnings 
management, (ii) concurrent research shows that certain banks overvalued their 
financial assets during the crisis (Huizinga and Laeven 2009; Laux and Leuz 
2010; Vyas 2011), (iii) both the importance and measurement uncertainty of 
Level 3 fair values increased during 2008 (Ryan, 2008; FASB, 2008; and FASB, 
2009), and (iv) the media and some academic literature claim that discretion in 
fair value measurement of illiquid assets was a major issue during the crisis 
(Laux and Leuz 2009; Kothari and Lester 2012). 
However, empirically identifying earnings management during the 2008 
Financial Crisis is difficult. First, the significant shock to banks during that 
period causes real effects on bank earnings that might confound with strategic 
earnings management. Therefore, to estimate the non-discretionary portion of 
Level 3 gains or losses, we develop a model capturing specific features of the 
crisis including bank size, business model, leverage, exposure to mortgage-
backed securities, the relative importance of Level 3 positions, and transfers into 
or out of Level 3. In addition, we run regressions by using bank fixed effects to 
control for any unobserved differences between banks. Most importantly, we 
conduct “placebo” tests with Level 3 gains or losses recognized in other 
comprehensive income (OCI). OCI gains or losses, by definition, do not affect 
earnings, and thus they cannot be used to manage earnings. Therefore, finding 
no correlation between estimated discretionary Level 3 OCI and proxies for 
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earnings management incentives increases confidence that our main results are 
not simply driven by real effects attributable to the crisis. 
We further acknowledge that other earnings management tools exist beside 
discretionary Level 3 gains or losses. We select loan loss provisions (LLP) as a 
benchmark for several reasons: Loans comprise a substantial portion of bank 
assets, and thus loan loss provisioning was central to bank earnings during the 
2008 Financial Crisis (Barth and Landsman 2010). In addition, LLP may be 
subject to both timing and measurement discretion, as bank managers estimate 
changes in expected future loan losses. Finally, previous literature (e.g., Beaver 
and Engel 1996; Ahmed et al. 1999; Beatty et al. 2002) finds that banks use LLP 
to manage capital and earnings.  
Given the importance of reported earnings by publicly held banks (e.g., 
DeAngelo et al. 1996; Barth et al. 1999; Beatty et al. 2002), we hypothesize that 
banks engage in earnings management. During weak financial periods, banks 
have particular incentives to manage earnings upwards (e.g., by avoiding write-
downs) to improve both earnings and capital, and thus they forego financial 
distress. Therefore, we hypothesize that banks with low earnings before 
unrealized gains or losses (hereafter, “premanaged earnings”) have incentives 
to increase earnings by discretionary measurement of unrealized gains or losses. 
Second, as banks have incentives to avoid earnings decreases (e.g., Beatty 
2002), we expect that banks facing a negative change in premanaged earnings 
recognize income-increasing unrealized gains or losses. Third, we expect that 
earnings management incentives are particularly pronounced for banks with 
small negative premanaged earnings, as these banks might achieve reporting 
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positive earnings with little discretion effort (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev 
1997). Finally, we investigate whether banks with low premanaged regulatory 
Tier 1 capital engage in income-increasing earnings management, because 
regulatory capital is particularly important during bust times. 
Using consolidated 10-Q and 10-K reports, we hand-collect data on 
unrealized holding gains or losses on Level 3 positions affecting net income 
(hereafter, “Level 3 income”) from the disclosures required under Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 157, para. 32-33 (FASB 2006). As 
SFAS 157 became mandatorily effective for annual periods on or after 15 
November 2007, our sample period is limited to Q1 2008 through Q1 2009. We 
additionally collect Level 3 gains or losses recognized in OCI to conduct our 
placebo tests. 
To test our hypotheses, we follow a two-step procedure. First, we estimate 
the non-discretionary components of Level 3 income, Level 3 OCI, and LLP. 
We control for various non-discretionary components including bank fixed 
effects. Second, by using the residuals from the regressions, we test whether 
banks with incentives to manage earnings (i.e., low premanaged earnings, 
negative change in premanaged earnings, small negative premanaged earnings, 
and low premanaged Tier 1 capital) recognize more income-increasing 
discretionary gains or losses than the control group.  
Based on a sample of 329 listed U.S. banks (1,215 observations), we find 
that banks manage both earnings and capital with discretionary Level 3 income. 
Specifically, banks with low premanaged earnings increase the reported return 
on equity (ROE) on average by 1.08 percent. Moreover, 84.3 percent of banks 
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switch from small negative premanaged earnings to positive reported earnings 
by recognizing discretionary Level 3 income. As we do not find evidence of 
earnings management for discretionary Level 3 OCI gains or losses, our main 
results are unlikely to be solely driven by real effects associated with the 2008 
Financial Crisis.  
We find that banks also use discretionary LLP to manage earnings. However, 
the empirical evidence is less consistent compared to the evidence from the 
Level 3 tests. A possible explanation for this result is that LLP were subject to 
increased scrutiny during the crisis, particularly after the Lehman collapse. 
While input factors of Level 3 estimates are by definition unobservable, banks 
are required to disclose non-performing loans, which is a relatively non-
discretionary and timely source of information about loan default (Liu and Ryan 
2006). Consistent with that explanation, the coefficient estimates of the control 
variables reveal that a change in non-performing assets is one-to-one translated 
into a LLP.  
We find no evidence that better corporate governance mechanisms reduce 
earnings management with discretionary Level 3 income. This finding can be 
interpreted as indication that (i) Level 3 positions are inherently difficult to 
verify, (ii) monitors can verify Level 3 fair value estimates but are powerless or 
not willing to intervene, or (iii) our corporate governance measure is biased to 
the extent that higher scores are associated with banks that are more severely 
affected by the 2008 Financial Crisis.  
The findings contribute to the debate on fair value accounting (e.g., Plantin 
et al. 2008; Laux and Leuz 2009; Barth and Landsman 2010; Kothari and Lester 
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2011). We provide evidence that banks use discretionary fair value estimates to 
manage earnings. By examining unrealized gains or losses, we also deal with 
the critique of Barth and Taylor (2010) who provide alternative explanations for 
the findings of Dechow et al. (2010). Therefore, the results confirm concerns 
regarding the use of fair values in non-active markets, particularly because 
corporate governance mechanisms are essentially ineffective for reducing 
measurement discretion. In addition, our findings shed light on the reasons why 
investors apply a discount to Level 3 assets during the crisis (Kolev 2009, Goh 
et al. 2009, and Song et al. 2010). Our evidence supports the argument that 
banks overstated Level 3 assets, rather than the explanation that fire-sale or 
illiquidity concerns caused the valuation discount. Finally, by finding evidence 
that certain banks exploited the measurement leeway of financial assets to 
manage earnings during the 2008 Financial Crisis, the study adds to recent 
research on bank behavior during the crisis (e.g., Huizinga and Laeven 2009; 
Laux and Leuz 2010; Vyas 2011; Badertscher et al. 2011).  
The results are subject to caveats. First, detecting and measuring earnings 
management is difficult (Dechow et al. 1995). However, we deal with this issue 
by running several modifications of the model, and we obtain consistent results 
across different model specifications. In particular, we include bank fixed effects 
to control for omitted correlated variables, and we conduct placebo tests with 
Level 3 gains or losses recognized in OCI. Second, although using the 
prominent bank earnings management tool LLP as a benchmark, we 
acknowledge the existence of other tools for earnings management. 
Specifically, we do not cover the timing of investment security gains (e.g., 
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Scholes et al. 1990; Beatty et al. 2002) or discretionary gains from asset 
securitizations (Dechow et al. 2010). However, given the intense debate on fair 
value measurement, our focus is intentional. Third, when examining fair value 
measurement discretion, we cover only Level 3 fair values, not Level 1 and 
Level 2 positions. Level 2 fair values may be subject to measurement discretion, 
as they are also based on valuation models. However, we cannot conduct such 
tests, as SFAS 157 does not require disclosure on unrealized gains or losses on 
Level 2 positions.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
relevant literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research 
design. Section 4 outlines the sample selection process and provides descriptive 
statistics, Section 5 presents the main results, and Section 6 provides additional 
analyses. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
2.1 Earnings management of banks 
According to the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting of the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the objective of financial 
reporting is to provide information that is useful to decision makers (FASB 
2010). Financial information subject to earnings management does not meet this 
objective. However, the recognition or measurement (or both) of certain balance 
sheet items is based on significant management assumptions. As these items are 
difficult for outsiders to verify, they provide opportunities for engaging in 
earnings management. 
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In the field of bank accounting, previous literature focuses on discretionary 
LLP (e.g., Beaver and Engel 1996; Ahmed et al. 1999; Beatty et al. 2002). LLP 
offer room for manipulation, as bank managers estimate changes in future loan 
losses. In addition, research shows that banks manage earnings with the timing 
of realized gains from security transactions (e.g., Scholes et al. 1990; Beatty et 
al. 2002). 
Spurred by the Financial Crisis, recent bank-related studies examine the 
discretion afforded by the accounting for financial instruments. Song (2008) 
finds that banks use the transitional provisions of the fair value option under 
SFAS 159 to remove accumulated losses on investment securities. Moreover, 
Song (2008) finds that banks meet earnings targets by managing earnings with 
the fair value option. Dechow and Shakespeare (2009) and Dechow et al. (2010) 
show that financial institutions use fair value gains or losses from asset 
securitization to smooth earnings. Huizinga and Laeven (2009) find that banks 
use the discretion in the classification of financial instruments to manage 
earnings upwards. By classifying mortgage-backed securities as financial assets 
held-to-maturity (HTM), banks are not obligated to recognize unrealized fair 
value losses, and thus the assets are overvalued. Vyas (2011) demonstrates that 
write-downs are not timely recognized during the Financial Crisis. Using a 
sample of four large U.S. banks, Laux and Leuz (2010) find descriptive 
evidence that reported loan losses of banks are smaller than loan loss estimates 
by external parties. This finding suggests that banks use the discretion in 
accounting rules to avoid write-downs on their loan portfolios.  
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2.2 Hypotheses 
To examine whether banks use measurement discretion to manage earnings, 
we focus on unrealized gains or losses on Level 3 positions (i.e., Level 3 
income). The measurement of Level 3 fair values is based on models with 
unobservable, firm-supplied valuation inputs. Therefore, the resulting fair 
values are difficult, if not impossible, for outsiders to verify (Ryan 2008). 
Management may use this leeway to engage in earnings management.  
We select the 2008 Financial Crisis as the investigation period because it 
offers both opportunities and incentives for managing earnings. First, Amiram 
et al. (2010) show that, in 2008, U.S. capital markets strongly reacted to 
announcements of write-downs on asset-backed securities, impairments on 
retained interests, and losses on loans. In addition, banks that were severely 
affected by the crisis had incentives to forego the downward spiral by 
recognizing lower-than-necessary losses on financial instruments. Second, 
certain markets for financial instruments became illiquid during the 2008 
Financial Crisis. For these positions, quoted prices in active markets are not 
available for determining the fair values. When fair values cannot be marked-
to-market, the management must use assumptions to estimate the fair value. 
Given these substantial measurement uncertainties, the crisis provides unique 
opportunities for managing earnings through discretionary measurement of fair 
values. 
However, the measurement uncertainty during the 2008 Financial Crisis 
makes disentangling strategic earnings manipulation from simple estimation 
error difficult. Therefore, we additionally conduct a placebo test with Level 3 
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gains or losses recognized in other comprehensive income (OCI). As such gains 
and losses do not affect reported earnings, earnings management should not be 
observed for Level 3 OCI. To the extent that Level 3 income and Level 3 OCI 
are similarly affected by the crisis, the use of Level 3 OCI as a “placebo” reduces 
concerns that our main tests are biased by real effects associated with the 2008 
Financial Crisis.  
We use LLP as a benchmark to Level 3 income. As loans comprise a large 
portion of bank assets, LLP is central to bank earnings (Barth and Landsman 
2010). In addition, previous literature identifies LLP as possible earnings 
management tool for banks. We conduct the same analyses for LLP as for Level 
3 income and compare the results across both income statement items. To 
enhance comparability across Level 3 income and loan loss provisions, we label 
LLP as a negative amount (i.e., loan loss provisions multiplied by –1), so that 
negative values denote a decrease in earnings (Nichols et al. 2009, p. 111).  
Following previous literature (e.g., Wahlen 1994; Dechow et al. 2010), we 
expect that banks with low or negative earnings before discretionary income 
(i.e., premanaged earnings) improve their reported earnings by exercising 
income-increasing discretion (e.g., lower-than-necessary Level 3 losses). We 
thus state the following earnings management hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Discretionary Level 3 income (LLP) is higher for banks with 
low premanaged earnings than for the control group. 
 
In addition to the absolute level of earnings, we predict that banks have 
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incentives to manage earnings depending on the change in premanaged earnings 
from the previous to the current quarter (e.g., Beatty et al. 2002; Dechow et al. 
2010). For example, a bank reporting a positive change in earnings signals a 
positive trend to the market, irrespective of whether the absolute level of 
earnings remains negative. Our second hypothesis is thus as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Discretionary Level 3 income (LLP) is higher for banks with 
negative changes in premanaged earnings than for the 
control group. 
 
Earnings management is particularly attractive when premanaged earnings 
are just below the threshold of zero, as only little discretion effort is required to 
report positive earnings. Therefore, incentives to engage in earnings are 
typically “kinky” around zero (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). We predict that 
banks with small negative earnings have particular incentives to recognize 
income-increasing unrealized gains or losses. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Discretionary Level 3 income (LLP) is higher for banks with 
small negative premanaged earnings than for the control 
group. 
 
Finally, previous banking literature shows that regulatory capital is 
particularly important to banks (e.g., Beatty et al. 1995; Ahmed et al. 1999). In 
addition, as many banks struggled with regulatory capital requirements during 
the crisis, maintaining a sufficient capital ratio is a major reporting objective. 
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Therefore, we predict that banks use measurement discretion to increase 
regulatory Tier 1 capital. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Discretionary Level 3 income (LLP) is higher for banks with 
low premanaged Tier 1 capital ratios than for the control 
group. 
 
3. Research design 
3.1 Estimation of discretionary income 
3.1.1 Discretionary Level 3 income 
To test our hypotheses, we first estimate discretionary Level 3 income 
(DL3INC). We regress Level 3 income (L3INC) on explanatory variables and 
define the regression residuals as discretionary Level 3 income (DL3INC). 
We scale Level 3 income with the beginning book value of equity. As the 
total assets of a bank are typically very large, scaling with equity results in 
“more meaningful figures” (Dechow et al. 2010, p. 10). Furthermore, the return 
on equity is considered to be the “most common measure for bank performance” 
(ECB 2010, p.5), and executive compensation contracts are typically linked to 
returns on equity (e.g., Lambert and Larcker 1987; Cadman et al. 2010).1  
By definition, fair value gains or losses are unrealized. SFAS 157, para. 32, 
defines unrealized gains or losses included in earnings as gains or losses relating 
to assets or liabilities still held at the reporting date (FASB 2006). Level 3 
                                                     
1  However, given the criticism of scaling by equity (Barth and Taylor 2010), for robustness, 
we scale L3INC by lagged total assets in Section 6. 
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positions measured at fair value on a non-recurring basis are infrequently 
measured at fair value; however, if they are, they may be subject to 
measurement discretion. In addition, as bank managers may also exercise 
measurement discretion on liabilities, we include unrealized gains or losses on 
Level 3 liabilities in our proxy for L3INC. Therefore, we consider fair value 
adjustments on recurring Level 3 assets, recurring Level 3 liabilities, and non-
recurring Level 3 assets for L3INC. We do not include unrealized Level 3 gains 
or losses recognized in OCI (e.g., changes in fair value of available-for-sale 
securities classified as Level 3), as they do not affect net income (FASB 1993).  
To estimate the model, we pool data across bank-quarters. As Rogers (1993) 
suggests, we use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by bank.2 
We estimate the following regression model: 
 
L3INCit = β0 + β1SIZEit-1 + β2LEVERAGEit-1 + β3NPAit-1  
+ β4MBS_HTMit-1 + β5MBS_AFSit-1 + β6MBS_HFTit-1  
+ β7FVA3it-1 + β8FVL3it-1 + β9NR_FVA3it-1  
+ β10TRANSFERit + β11-14QUARTERt + β15-18SUBINDi + εit (1) 
 
where: 
L3INC  = unrealized (fair value) gains or losses on recurring and non-
recurring Level 3 positions scaled by lagged equity; 
                                                     
2  We do not use two-way clustered standard errors, as two-way clustering presumes 
homoscedasticity within clusters (Petersen 2009). This might be a strong assumption during 
the 2008 Financial Crisis. However, when alternatively estimating the regressions with two-
way clustered standard errors (clustering across both quarters and banks), the absolute t-
statistics increase rather than decrease. 
  14 
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the 
quarter; 
LEVERAGE = debt-to-assets ratio (leverage) at the beginning of the quarter; 
NPA = non-performing assets at the beginning of the quarter scaled 
by lagged total assets; 
MBS_HTM = mortgage-backed securities classified as held-to-maturity at 
the beginning of the quarter scaled by lagged total assets; 
MBS_AFS = mortgage-backed securities classified as available-for-sale at 
the beginning of the quarter scaled by lagged total assets; 
MBS_HFT = mortgage-backed securities classified as trading securities at 
the beginning of the quarter scaled by lagged total assets; 
FVA3 = Level 3 assets at the beginning of the quarter scaled by lagged 
total assets; 
FVL3 = Level 3 liabilities at the beginning of the quarter scaled by 
lagged total assets; 
NR_FVA3 = non-recurring Level 3 assets at the beginning of the quarter 
scaled by lagged total assets; 
TRANSFERS = net transfer of assets or liabilities into or out of Level 3 scaled 
by lagged total assets; 
QUARTER = quarter fixed effects for each quarter from Q2 2008 through 
Q1 2009;  
SUBIND = sub-industry fixed effects; and 
ε = error term. 
We include several explanatory variables to estimate the non-discretionary 
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portion of Level 3 income. Specifically, we control for exposure to mortgage-
backed securities, as these financial instruments were a major source of risk 
during the 2008 Financial Crisis. Huizinga and Laeven (2009) find that banks 
use discretion in classification of the financial instruments to avoid reporting 
unrealized losses. Therefore, we distinguish between mortgage-backed 
securities classified as held-to-maturity (MBS_HTM), available-for-sale 
(MBS_AFS), and trading (MBS_HFT). According to SFAS 115, (i) changes in 
fair value of trading securities are recognized in the income statement, (ii) 
changes in fair value of available-for-sale securities are recognized directly in 
equity except for impairments, and (iii) securities held-to-maturity are measured 
at amortized cost (FASB 1993). Therefore, we expect the negative association 
between L3INC and exposure to mortgage-backed securities to be most 
pronounced for MBS_HFT.  
We control for the relative importance for the bank’s balance sheet. We 
distinguish three types of Level 3 positions: recurring Level 3 assets, recurring 
Level 3 liabilities, and non-recurring Level 3 assets. The intuition behind this 
distinction is that these positions may have different risk profiles and thus have 
different impacts on Level 3 income. Due to the high degree of illiquidity 
associated with Level 3 assets, we expect negative coefficients of FVA3, FVL3, 
and NR_FVA3.  
TRANSFERS controls for the transfers into or out of Level 3. The transfer of 
large holdings into Level 3 indicates that no observable inputs are currently 
available for these holdings. In the absence of discretionary measurement, the 
bank likely immediately recognizes a loss on the transferred position in the 
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quarter of the transfer. Thus we expect a negative coefficient of TRANSFERS. 
NPA controls for ex ante exposure to non-performing assets. Although non-
performing assets typically consist of loans that are 90 days past due, we include 
NPA to control for non-discretionary L3INC, as the level of non-performing 
assets can affect non-recurring Level 3 gains or losses. We expect a negative 
coefficient of NPA because the recognition of Level 3 losses is more likely for 
large holdings in non-performing assets. 
To account for the specific market conditions during the 2008 Financial 
Crisis, we use SIZE and LEVERAGE as additional control variables. We define 
SIZE as the natural logarithm of total assets. As large banks are more likely to 
be exposed to systemic risks in the loan portfolio, we predict a negative 
association between SIZE and LLP. We control for different financing structures 
by using the debt-to-asset ratio as a proxy for the bank’s financial leverage. 
Given that banks with high leverage are likely to be in financial distress, and 
thus have to recognize large provisions for loan losses, we expect a negative 
coefficient.  
To control for the bank’s operational characteristics, we include fixed effects 
for the following sub-industries: savings and loans institutions, regional 
operating banks, investment services, and money center banks.3 To control for 
differences in the macro-economic environment across periods, we include 
quarter fixed effects for all but the base quarter Q1 2008 (Wooldridge 2002). 
                                                     
3  For example, Elliot et al. (1991) find significant differences in size, loan loss reserves, loan 
loss provisions, exposure to lesser developed countries, and capital adequacy ratios between 
money center banks and other banks. In addition, Scholes et al. (1990) and Beatty et al. 
(1995) include in their empirical analyses a dummy variable for money center banks.  
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3.1.2 Discretionary Level 3 OCI 
We use discretionary Level 3 other comprehensive income (DL3OCI) as a 
placebo for DL3INC. To estimate DL3OCI, we regress Level 3 other 
comprehensive income (L3OCI) on the same explanatory variables as L3INC. 
DL3OCI is then used to perform identical statistical tests as we conduct with 
DL3INC. 
 
L3OCIit = β0 + β1SIZEit-1 + β2LEVERAGEit-1 + β3NPAit-1  
+ β4MBS_HTMit-1 + β5MBS_AFSit-1 + β6MBS_HFTit-1  
+ β7FVA3it-1 + β8FVL3it-1 + β9NR_FVA3it-1  
+ β10TRANSFERit + β11-14QUARTERt + β15-18SUBINDi + εit (2) 
 
 
3.1.3 Discretionary LLP 
Following Nichols et al. (2009), we define LLP as negative amounts. Thus 
negative values denote a decrease in earnings. With this definition, 
interpretation of LLP is both intuitive (i.e., negative amounts represent 
expenses) and enhances comparability with the Level 3 analyses. 
To estimate the discretionary component of LLP we build on models used in 
previous research designs (e.g., Ahmed et al. 1999; Beatty et al. 2002; 
Kanagaretnam et al. 2004). We amend equation (1) to the following regression 
model: 
 
LLPit = β0 + β1SIZEit-1 + β2LEVERAGEit-1 + β3NPAit-1 +  β4ΔNPAit 
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+ β5LOANSit-1 + β6ΔLOANSit + β7-10 QUARTERt 
+ β11-14SUBINDi + εit (3) 
where: 
LLP  = loan loss provisions multiplied by –1 scaled by lagged equity; 
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the 
quarter; 
LEVERAGE = debt-to-assets ratio at the beginning of the quarter; 
NPA = non-performing assets at the beginning of the quarter scaled 
by lagged total assets; 
ΔNPA = change in non-performing assets from the previous to the 
current quarter scaled by lagged total assets; 
LOANS = gross loans (i.e., before loan loss allowance) at the beginning 
of the quarter scaled by lagged total assets; 
ΔLOANS = change in gross loans from the previous to the current quarter 
scaled by lagged total assets; 
QUARTER = quarter fixed effects for each quarter from Q2 2008 through 
Q1 2009;  
SUBIND = sub-industry fixed effects; and 
ε = error term. 
 
In addition to the explanatory variables employed in the Level 3 income 
model (i.e., SIZE, LEVERAGE, NPA, QUARTER, SUBIND), we control for the 
development in the quality of the loan portfolio, by using the change in non-
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performing loans (ΔNPA). If the quality of the loan portfolio worsens, we expect 
the provisions to increase. Thus we predict a negative coefficient between 
ΔNPA and LLP. We include gross loans (before loan loss allowance) as a 
percentage of total assets at the beginning of the quarter to control for the 
relative importance of loans for the bank’s balance sheet. During bust times with 
higher default rates, a large loan portfolio before allowances is expected to 
induce higher LLP. Therefore, we predict a negative coefficient between 
LOANS and LLP. To control for the growth in loans, we include the change in 
gross loans from the previous to the current quarter. As a growing loan portfolio 
increases the likelihood of loan losses in economic downturns, we expect a 
negative coefficient of ΔLOANS. 
 
3.1.4 Bank fixed effects 
Although we include several control variables to explain the non-
discretionary income component, our tests could nevertheless be biased by 
correlated omitted variables. For example, because of data limitations, we 
cannot control for possible determinants of unrealized gains or losses such as 
investments in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), different loan 
characteristics beyond the already included controls, and risks associated with 
the consolidation of variable interest entities (VIEs).  
We deal with possible omitted variables by including bank fixed effects 
along with the other control variables in models (1) through (3). We define the 
residuals from the fixed effects regressions as the discretionary income 
components DL3INC_FE, DL3OCI_FE, and DL3LLP_FE. 
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However, if earnings management is a firm-specific, time-invariant 
characteristic rather than a function of particular incentives to manage earnings, 
the inclusion of bank fixed effects confounds with our earnings management 
tests. In addition, fixed effects regression models assume time-constant omitted 
variables. This assumption may be open to question in this specific setting, that 
is, the 2008 Financial Crisis. 
 
3.2 Incentives to manage earnings 
To detect earnings management, we test whether DL3INC and DLLP are 
higher for banks with high incentives to manage earnings than for banks with 
low incentives (i.e., the control group). According to our hypotheses, we should 
observe this pattern for DL3INC and DLLP. As a placebo control, we 
additionally test the effects on DL3OCI. We do not expect a correlation between 
earnings management incentives and our placebo DL3OCI, as DL3OCI is not 
recognized in net income. If an earnings management pattern is observable for 
DL3INC and DLLP but not for DL3OCI, our tests are more likely to capture 
earnings management (bias) rather than estimation error (noise) induced by real 
effects of the 2008 Financial Crisis. 
According to our hypotheses, we use four earnings management incentives. 
First, we define premanaged earnings (NIBDL3INC and NIBDLLP) are as net 
income minus (NI) estimated discretionary income (DL3INC and DLLP).4 
Following Kanagaretnam et al. (2004), we define low premanaged earnings as 
                                                     
4  As DL3OCI is our placebo for DL3INC, we define the incentives (e.g., low premanaged 
earnings) for DL3OCI identical to the incentives for DL3INC. 
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NIBDL3INC (NIBDLLP) below the 25th percentile, and we define the control 
group as banks with premanaged earnings between the median and the 75th 
percentile.5 According to Hypothesis 1, banks with low premanaged earnings 
recognize income-increasing DL3INC and DLLP. Therefore, we predict that 
these banks have (i) positive values of DL3INC and DLLP, and (ii) significant 
larger DL3INC and DLLP than the control group. 
Our second incentive is a negative change in premanaged earnings. We 
compare discretionary income of banks where premanaged earnings have 
decreased (incentive group) to banks where premanaged earnings have 
increased (control group). In accordance with Hypothesis 2, we predict that 
DL3INC and DLLP are higher for banks with decreasing premanaged earnings 
compared to banks with increasing premanaged earnings from the previous to 
the current quarter. 
As a third incentive, we use small negative premanaged earnings. Following 
Hypothesis 3, we test whether banks with small negative premanaged earnings 
recognize higher discretionary income than banks with small positive 
premanaged earnings. We define SMALLNEG as premanaged earnings that are 
in the interval just below zero. Following Beatty et al. (2002), we calculate this 
interval as twice the bin width used in the histograms of NIBL3 and NIBLLP, 
respectively. We define the bin width of the histogram as twice the inter-quartile 
ranges of NIBL3 and NIBLLP, respectively, multiplied by the negative cube root 
of the sample size (Degeorge et al. 1999). We then test whether the group 
                                                     
5  Banks with premanaged earnings above the median (i.e., control group) have less incentive 
to manage their earnings upwards, as the median of premanaged earnings is above the 
threshold of zero (see Panel B of Table 4 in Section 5).  
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SMALLNEG has both income-increasing and significantly larger DL3INC and 
DLLP than the control group (i.e., banks with small positive premanaged 
earnings). 
Our fourth incentive is low premanaged regulatory capital defined as the Tier 
1 regulatory capital ratio minus discretionary income. In accordance with 
Hypothesis 4, we expect that DL3INC and DLLP are higher for banks with a 
low premanaged Tier 1 capital ratio than for banks with a high premanaged Tier 
1 ratio. Similar to our first incentive, we define banks where the premanaged 
Tier 1 ratio is below the 25th percentile as low capitalized, and we define banks 
where the premanaged Tier 1 ratio is between the median and the 75th percentile 
as control group. 
 
3.3 Alternative specifications of premanaged earnings 
As our first additional tests, we use the discretionary income components as 
estimated with bank fixed effects. Accordingly, we define premanaged earnings 
as net income (NI) minus DL3INC_FE and DL3LLP_FE. 
As the determination of premanaged earnings and premanaged Tier1 ratio is 
based on our estimation of DL3INC and DLLP, our main tests could be biased 
if estimation error in DL3INC and DLLP is correlated with premanaged 
earnings or premanaged Tier1 ratio. Therefore, we perform additional tests by 
defining premanaged numbers as net income (Tier1 ratio) minus L3INC and 
LLP, respectively. Subtracting the full amount of L3INC and LLP has the 
advantage that premanaged earnings cannot be mechanically correlated with the 
estimation of discretionary income. However, the disadvantage is that both 
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incentives and decisions to manage earnings base on earnings before 
discretionary income, but not on earnings before the full amount of unrealized 
income. 
So far, we assume that the decision to manage earnings with either Level 3 
income or LLP is independent. Indeed, bank managers may exploit 
measurement leeway on both financial assets. For example, it is likely that 
management faces increased scrutiny when exaggerating discretion in LLP, and 
thus discretionary Level 3 income is a welcomed alternative for managing 
earnings. If the decision to manage earnings with L3INC and LLP is not 
independent, then our incentive variables are already managed numbers 
themselves. Therefore, we perform our tests by defining our incentive variables 
as net income before both DL3INC and DLLP. 
 
4. Sample description 
To construct the sample, we use the database Thomson Reuters. The basic 
sample comprises 539 U.S. banks that apply SFAS 157. As SFAS 157 became 
mandatorily effective for annual periods on or after 15 November 2007, we 
collect quarterly data from Q1 2008 through Q1 2009. This procedure yields an 
initial sample of 2,695 observations. We exclude 618 observations because of 
missing data on net income, loan loss provisions, book value of equity, gross 
loans, or total assets in Thomson Reuters. We use Compustat to obtain data on 
non-performing assets (Compustat quarterly data item #99). Because some 
banks from the initial sample in Thomson Reuters are not covered by Compustat 
  24 
or data is missing in Compustat, we exclude 40 observations. The sample for 
the LLP tests contains 2037 observations (421 banks). 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Using 10-Q and 10-K filings from EDGAR, we hand-collect data on 
unrealized Level 3 gains or losses on recurring and non-recurring fair value 
positions from the disclosures required by SFAS 157, para. 32–33 (FASB 
2006).6 We also hand-collect Level 3 OCI, Level 3 assets, Level 3 liabilities, 
non-recurring Level 3 assets, and Level 3 transfer information from the 10-Q 
and 10-K reports. We exclude 128 observations due to missing fair value data 
of banks with annual reporting periods ending in March, June, and September. 
We further exclude 311 observations without Level 3 positions. Using Call 
Reports from the database Bank Regulatory Holding Companies, we collect 
data on mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Due to missing Call Reports, the 
sample size is further reduced by 383 observations. These procedures yield a 
sample of 1215 observations, representing 329 U.S. bank holding companies.7  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the regression variables. We are 
                                                     
6  The hand-collection of Level 3 income and Level 3 OCI is necessary because commercial 
data providers do not provide data on fair value gains or losses on Level 3 positions.  
7  As a robustness check, we also use the smaller sample (i.e., only banks with non-zero Level 
3 positions are included in the sample) for the tests of LLP. The results remain virtually 
constant, indicating that our inferences are not driven by different samples. 
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not surprised by the negative mean and median values of L3INC, L3OCI, and 
LLP. On average, banks report losses in lieu of gains on their financial assets. 
However, income-increasing earnings management is still possible by 
recognizing lower-than-necessary losses. A few banks even report Level 3 gains 
despite the crisis. The 75 percentile of L3INC is zero, indicating that some 
sample banks do not disclose Level 3 gains or losses, although they do have 
Level 3 positions in their portfolio. The mean of LLP is –0.022, whereas the 
mean of L3INC is –0.012, suggesting that the loan loss provisions are higher in 
magnitude than Level 3 income. Although recurring Level 3 assets are only 0.6 
percent of total assets, Level 3 income is economically relevant, as documented 
by both the mean value relative to equity of –1.2 percent and the standard 
deviation of 4.0 percent. 
The mean and median of gross loans as a percentage of total assets are 0.710 
and 0.730, respectively. Therefore, loans are a major balance sheet position of 
banks. In Panel A, the mortgage-backed securities are predominantly classified 
as available-for-sale securities. As the 25th percentile, the median, and the 75th 
percentile of TRANSFERS are zero, banks do rarely (disclose) transfers from 
Level 1 and Level 2 into Level 3. The positive mean of 0.001 indicates that more 
assets were transferred into Level 3 than out of Level 3 during the sample 
period. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Table 3 shows Pearson correlation coefficients of the regression variables. 
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The coefficients of the control variables have the predicted signs except for 
ΔLOANS, which is positively correlated with LLP. As expected, Level 3 
exposure (FVA3, FVL3, and NR_FVA3) is negatively correlated with Level 3 
income. Notably, mortgage-backed securities classified as trading (MBS_HFT) 
are negatively correlated with L3INC; whereas mortgage-backed securities 
classified as available-for-sale (MBS_AFS) are negatively correlated with 
L3OCI. 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Estimation of discretionary income 
First, we estimate the discretionary components of L3INC, L3OCI and LLP. 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the results of the OLS regression estimates of the 
variables that explain the non-discretionary part. In regressions (1) and (2), 
L3INC is the dependent variable, in regressions (3) and (4), L3OCI is the 
dependent variable, and in regressions (5) and (6), LLP is the dependent 
variable. Regressions (5) and (6) have an R2 of 57.94 percent and 32.28 percent, 
respectively: the values are comparable to or even higher than previous research 
in which LLP is the dependent variable.8 The R2 values are lower in models (1) 
and (2), as well as in (3) and (4), indicating that the explanatory power of the 
model is lower for L3INC (L3OCI) than for LLP. Therefore, either our model 
for estimating LLP is better specified than the L3INC (L3OCI) model or, 
                                                     
8  For example, the explanatory power of the model employed by Ahmed et al. (1999, p. 12) 
is 20.0%, and Beatty et al. (2002, p. 564) explain 21.0 percent of the variation in LLP. We 
attribute the higher explanatory power of our model to the additional inclusion of both the 
leverage ratio and the sub-industry dummies. However, we acknowledge that the model 
specifications are not identical, and thus the differences in R2 should be interpreted with 
caution. 
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alternatively, Level 3 income is inherently more difficult to estimate than LLP. 
Not surprisingly, the R2 values of the regressions substantially increase when 
running the fixed effects regressions. In models (1), (3), and (5), the R2 values 
increase to 40.9, 56.3, and 57.9 percent, respectively. While the signs of the 
estimated coefficients do not change substantially, the significance levels of 
some control variables decrease. We are not concerned by this result, because 
these bank-specific characteristics are likely to be captured by the fixed effects. 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
The coefficients of the explanatory variables are broadly consistent with 
expectations. Banks with large amounts of non-performing assets relative to 
total assets tend to report lower L3INC and LLP. Notably, in models (5) and (6), 
the coefficients for ΔNPA of –0.932 and –1.026, respectively, indicate that a 
change in non-performing assets is one-to-one translated into a LLP. 
Furthermore, the significant negative coefficients of SIZE indicate that larger 
banks report unrealized losses rather than gains. Only mortgage-backed 
securities classified as trading securities (MBS_HFT) are negatively correlated 
with L3INC. This result is consistent with the findings of Huizinga and Laeven 
(2009) that banks avoid the recognition of unrealized losses on mortgage-
backed securities by classifying these positions as either held-to-maturity or 
available-for-sale. As expected, the relative amounts of recurring and non-
recurring Level 3 assets to total assets (FVA3 and NR_FVA3) are negatively 
associated with Level 3 income. However, the coefficients are not significant at 
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the 10 percent level or below. 
Panel B of Table 4 shows the distribution of the discretionary income 
components estimated with the regressions in Panel A without firm fixed effects 
(DL3INC, DL3OCI, DLLP) and with firm fixed effects (DL3INC_FE, 
DL3OCI_FE, DLLP_FE). The medians of DL3INC and DLLP of 0.005 and 
0.004, respectively, indicate that the majority of banks underestimate unrealized 
losses and thus report higher earnings.  
The reported net income as a percentage of beginning book value of equity 
(NI) is positive for the 25th percentile. Therefore, the majority of banks reported 
positive results despite the crisis, indicating that not all banks were similarly 
affected by the crisis. Alternatively, the positive NI may be the result of income-
increasing earnings management. 
The 25th percentile of premanaged earnings (NIBDL3INC and NIBDLLP) is 
negative for both net income before DL3INC and net income before DLLP, 
suggesting that these banks have strong incentives to manage their earnings 
upwards. The medians for NIBDL3 and NIBDLLP are slightly positive (0.010 
and 0.011). These banks have only few incentives to manage earnings upwards. 
Therefore, banks with above median premanaged earnings qualify as control 
group. 
 
5.2 Earnings management tests 
Table 5 reports the results of the earnings management tests. Panel A shows 
the mean values of DL3INC, DL3OCI, and DLLP across banks with earnings 
management incentives (i.e., low premanaged net income, negative change in 
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premanaged net income, small negative premanaged net income, and low 
premanaged Tier 1 capital) and the respective control groups. Untabulated 
median values and related tests yield to virtually identical results and inferences. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, banks with low premanaged income recognize 
both positive (i.e., income-increasing) discretionary Level 3 income (0.0108) 
and positive discretionary loan loss provisions (0.0032) to improve their 
reported earnings. The discretion in Level 3 is economically relevant, as the 
average bank with low premanaged earnings increases the reported return on 
equity (ROE) by 1.08 percent. However, while the difference in DL3INC of 
0.0090 between the incentive group and the control group is significant (t-
statistic = 3.72), the difference in DLLP of 0.0009 is not statistically significant. 
Therefore, we cannot accept Hypothesis 1 for loan loss provisions. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, banks facing a negative change in premanaged 
earnings recognize (i) income-increasing Level 3 and LLP income, and (ii) 
significantly larger mean DL3INC and DLLP than the control group. In 
addition, untabulated results reveal that the earnings management pays off, as 
indicated by the non-negative and positive mean change in reported earnings of 
0.0000 and 0.0001 for DL3INC and DLLP, respectively; compared to the 
negative mean changes in premanaged earnings of –0.0047 and –0.0023 for 
DL3INC and DLLP, respectively. Therefore, without earnings management, 
these banks would have to report a negative change in earnings; however, 
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because of their earnings management, these banks, on average, are able to 
signal a stable or even positive trend in earnings to the market, which is 
particularly important during bust times. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, banks with small negative earnings recognize 
income-increasing DL3INC and DLLP. Although the amounts are larger than 
the amounts of the control group, the differences of 0.0040 (0.0025) for DL3INC 
(DLLP) are not statistically significant at conventional levels. A possible 
explanation of this result is that banks with small positive income (i.e., the 
control group) also increase their reported income to establish a “buffer” during 
bust times, so that the difference in earnings management behavior between 
banks with small negative and small positive premanaged earnings is not as 
pronounced as in normal periods (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). 
Alternatively, the lower sample size (134 observations with small negative 
income; 204 observations with small positive income) favors accepting the null 
hypothesis of no difference between the incentive group and the control group. 
However, untabulated results show that 113 out of 134 (84.3%) banks switch 
from small negative premanaged net income to small positive reported income 
after recognizing discretionary Level 3 income. For DLLP, 116 out of 154 
(75.3%) banks switch the sign of their earnings. Taken together, the findings 
suggest that a vast majority of banks with small negative premanaged earnings 
achieve to report positive earnings with only little discretion effort, which is 
consistent with theory (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev 1997) 
Consistent with Hypothesis 4, banks with low premanaged Tier 1 capital 
recognize positive (i.e., capital-increasing) discretionary Level 3 and LLP 
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income. The difference between low capitalized banks and the control group is 
significant (t-statistic = 2.17) for DL3INC but insignificant for DLLP (t-statistic 
= 1.07). However, although the increase in capital (untabulated) of 0.0009 
(0.0004) for DL3INC (DLLP) is statistically significant (t-statistics = 5.86 and 
2.13), we do not consider the improvement in the mean Tier 1 capital ratio (i.e., 
from 8.67% to 8.76% for DL3INC, and from 8.72% to 8.76% for DLLP) to be 
economically relevant. 
For our placebo DL3OCI, we do not find that banks with earnings 
management incentives (e.g., low premanaged earnings) report significantly 
higher Level 3 income recognized in OCI. Therefore, our estimation of 
discretionary Level 3 income (DL3INC) is unlikely to be biased by real effects 
associated with the 2008 Financial Crisis. This finding supports the earnings 
management interpretation of the above results. 
Panel B shows the results when estimating the discretionary income 
components with bank fixed effects (DL3INC_FE, DL3OCI_FE, and 
DLLP_FE). Accordingly, premanaged earnings are defined as net income 
minus DL3INC_FE and DLLP_FE, respectively. The results of Panel B are 
generally consistent with the results of Panel A with two exceptions: First, the 
difference in DL3INC_FE of 0.0038 between low capitalized banks and the 
control group is not statistically significant. Second, banks with low 
premanaged earnings recognize significant larger DLLP_FE than the control 
group, so that we can accept Hypothesis 1 when using fixed effects estimation. 
Again, we do not find an earnings management pattern for Level 3 OCI. Overall, 
our findings seem not to be biased by omitted correlated variables.  
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Panel C presents the results when we define premanaged earnings (regulatory 
capital) as net income (Tier1 capital) minus the full amount of L3INC and LLP 
instead of subtracting the estimated discretionary components DL3INC and 
DLLP. The results in Panel C show that, for example, banks with low earnings 
and capital before Level 3 income have positive mean DL3INC of 0.0117 and 
0.0061, which are significantly higher than the mean DL3INC of the control 
groups. Taken together, the results in Panel C—based on an alternative 
definition of premanaged earnings—are broadly consistent with those from 
Panels A and B. This finding mitigates concerns that the estimated discretionary 
income is mechanically correlated with the incentive variables. 
In Panel D, we define premanaged earnings as net income and Tier1 ratio 
before both discretionary Level 3 income and discretionary LLP. The results are 
generally consistent with the findings in Panels A, B, and C. Notably, the 
difference in mean DL3INC of 0.0121 (t-statistic = 6.20) between banks with 
low premanaged earnings and the control group is more pronounced than in the 
previous specifications. This result indicates that the earnings before both 
income measures (i.e., Level 3 and LLP) are relevant for bank managers’ 
decision to engage in discretionary Level 3 measurement.  
 
6. Additional analyses 
6.1 The influence of corporate governance 
Both the competence and independence of monitors are important for 
minimizing management-induced bias in accounting estimation (e.g., Jensen 
1993; Penman 2007). Therefore, we predict that better corporate governance 
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mechanisms reduce opportunities for managing earnings. However, given the 
inherently large measurement leeway of Level 3 fair values (e.g., unobservable 
valuation inputs), banks might be able to manage their earnings despite strong 
corporate governance. Consistent with this argument, Dechow et al. (2010) find 
only limited evidence that better monitoring reduces discretionary securitization 
gains. For LLP, however, boards and auditors can exercise scrutiny by verifying 
the non-discretionary component of LLP through disclosures of non-performing 
loans (Liu and Ryan 2006). Therefore, the monitoring ability is likely to be 
higher for LLP than for Level 3 income. 
To test whether better monitoring reduces earnings management, we follow 
Vyas (2011) and we define the indicator variable CG that equals 1 if the 2007 
industry-adjusted corporate governance quotient (CGQ) provided by the 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) is above the sample median, and 0 
otherwise.9 Using an aggregated index has the advantage that a broad set of 
corporate governance tools is covered. Moreover, the tests may not be biased 
by arbitrary selection of corporate governance variables.  
Due to missing corporate governance data, we exclude 16 (340) observations 
for the analysis with L3INC (LLP) as the dependent variable. The mean 
(median) CGQ of 59.29 (63.80) are generally larger for the L3INC sample 
compared to the mean (median) CGQ of 54.59 (57.30) for the LLP sample. We 
test whether the mean discretionary income components (DL3INC, DL3OCI, 
and DLLP) differ across (i) the four earnings management incentive variables, 
                                                     
9  The index comprises 61 variables divided into eight categories: board structure, audit 
quality, charter and bylaw provisions, state of incorporation, ownership, executive and 
director compensation, progressive practices, and director education. 
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and (ii) strong (CG = 1) versus weak (CG = 0) corporate governance.   
The difference in discretionary Level 3 income (untabulated) of 0.0107 
between banks with low premanaged earnings and the control group is larger (t-
statistic = 4.12) for the group with weak corporate governance compared to the 
difference of 0.0077 (t-statistic = 1.93) for the group with strong corporate 
governance. However, when calculating discretionary Level 3 income with 
bank fixed effects, we do not find any difference across corporate governance 
groups. Moreover, for other earnings management incentives (i.e., change in 
premanaged earnings and low premanaged capital), the results are opposite; that 
is, banks with strong corporate governance appear to engage in more earnings 
management. The results for LLP are similarly inconclusive.  
Overall, when distinguishing between strong and weak corporate 
governance, we do not find a substantially different earnings management 
pattern for both Level 3 income and LLP as compared to the main tests. We 
interpret this finding as (i) corporate governance mechanisms were not effective 
during the 2008 crisis, or (ii) our corporate governance measure is not valid 
during the 2008 crisis, because the measure is usually positively correlated with 
size, but large banks were more severely affected during the crisis (see Panel A 
of Table 4). 
 
6.2 The influence of the Lehman bankruptcy 
The use of the 2008 Financial Crisis as a setting for observing discretionary 
measurement of unrealized gains or losses is twofold. On the one hand, the crisis 
provides both measurement leeway and strong incentives to engage in earnings 
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management. On the other hand, the market-wide measurement uncertainty 
makes disentangling strategic earnings manipulation from simple estimation 
error difficult.  
After the Lehman collapse, financial markets experienced serious 
turbulences. Therefore, fair value measurement became even more difficult. 
However, market-wide scrutiny towards accounting estimates might have also 
increased after the Lehman bankruptcy. To test the influence of the Lehman 
collapse on banks’ earnings management behavior, we split our sample period 
into Pre_Lehman (i.e., first and second quarter of 2008) and Post_Lehman (i.e., 
third and fourth quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009).10  
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
Table 6 presents mean DL3INC, DL3OCI, and DLLP across (i) earnings 
management incentives, and (ii) across time (i.e., Pre_Lehman vs. 
Post_Lehman). For discretionary Level 3 income, we do not find a different 
earnings management behavior before and after the Lehman collapse. If 
anything, Table 6 reveals that banks engaged in less capital management in the 
Post_Lehman period, as indicated by the insignificant difference of 0.0049 (t-
statistic = 1.41) between banks with low capital and the control group, whereas 
the difference of 0.0094 is highly significant (t-statistic = 3.15) in the 
Pre_Lehman period. This finding might be attributable to higher regulatory 
                                                     
10  The sample split also tackles concerns that our main results are solely driven by real effects 
associated with the market turbulences in the third and fourth quarter of 2008. 
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scrutiny for low capitalized banks after the Lehman bankruptcy. However, as 
the decreasing difference is mainly driven by the increase in DL3INC (from –
0.0005 to 0.0023) of the control group, this interpretation should be taken with 
caution. When calculating discretionary Level 3 income with bank fixed effects, 
the results (untabulated) are virtually identical.  
We find systematic less earnings management activities with discretionary 
LLP in the Post_Lehman period compared to the Pre_Lehman period. 
Specifically, neither banks with low premanaged earnings nor banks with low 
premanaged Tier 1 capital continue to recognize significantly more 
discretionary LLP than the control group after the Lehman collapse. We 
interpret this finding as evidence that LLP were subject to increased scrutiny 
after the Lehman bankruptcy, particularly for financially distressed banks (i.e., 
banks with low earnings and capital). This interpretation is supported by the 
finding that non-performing assets and the change in non-performing assets are 
one-to-one translated into a LLP (see Panel A of Table 4). 
 
6.3 Scaling of unrealized gains or losses 
Thus far, we have scaled both Level 3 income and LLP income by lagged 
equity, as the book value of equity is considered a meaningful measure of capital 
for banks (Dechow et al. 2010, p. 18). In addition, executive compensation 
contracts are typically linked to returns on equity (e.g., Lambert and Larcker 
1987; Cadman et al. 2010). However, other research in the field of bank 
accounting scales the dependent variable by lagged total assets (e.g., Beatty et 
al. 2002). Furthermore, Barth and Taylor (2010) argue that scaling by equity 
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could result in a mechanical negative association between the dependent and 
independent variable: Due to capital constraints, every dollar allocated to loans 
or Level 3 fair values is a dollar less allocated to other banking activities. 
However, we expect the mechanical effect to be of minor relevance, as we use 
unrealized gains or losses. For robustness, we nevertheless scale the income-
related variables (i.e., L3INC, L3OCI, LLP, and NI) by lagged total assets 
instead of lagged equity. 
We repeat our analysis from Table 5 with the new scaling. For Level 3 
income, untabulated findings suggest that banks with earnings management 
incentives engage in significantly more income-increasing discretionary Level 
3 income than the control group. Therefore, our inferences for Level 3 income 
are not affected by the scaling methodology. However, the LLP results are 




This paper investigates whether banks used discretion in fair value estimates 
based on unobservable inputs (i.e., Level 3 fair values) to manage earnings 
during the 2008 Financial Crisis. We benchmark our tests against LLP, mainly 
because LLP are the major unrealized income statement item for banks. We 
further conduct placebo tests with Level 3 gains or losses recognized in OCI. 
Using a sample of 291 U.S. bank holding companies from Q1 2008 through 
Q1 2009, we find that banks with incentives to manage earnings (i.e., low 
premanaged earnings, negative change in premanaged earnings, small negative 
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premanaged earnings, and low premanaged Tier 1 capital) recognize more 
income-increasing discretionary Level 3 income than the control group. We do 
not find evidence of earnings management for discretionary Level 3 OCI gains 
or losses, increasing confidence in our estimation of discretionary Level 3 
income. We find no empirical evidence that better corporate governance 
reduces earnings management. We attribute this finding to the inherently low 
verifiability of Level 3 fair values. We thus identify some room for 
improvement regarding the disclosure and transparency of fair value 
measurements, particularly during times of financial instability. This view is 
consistent with the following SEC postulate: 
“While the Staff does not recommend a suspension of existing fair 
value standards, the Staff believes that a number of measures should 
be taken to improve the application and practice related to existing 
fair value requirements (particularly as they relate to both Level 2 
and Level 3 estimates) including: […] Enhancing the existing 
disclosure and presentation requirements related to the effect of fair 
value in the financial statements […].” (SEC 2008, p. 202) 
 
We find that banks also use discretionary LLP to manage earnings. However, 
the empirical evidence is less consistent compared to the evidence from the 
Level 3 tests. A possible explanation for this result is that LLP were subject to 
increased scrutiny during the crisis, particularly after the Lehman collapse. 
While input factors of Level 3 estimates are by definition unobservable, banks 
are required to disclose non-performing loans, which is a relatively non-
discretionary and timely source of information about loan default (Liu and Ryan 
2006). Consistent with that explanation, the coefficient estimates of the control 
variables reveal that a change in non-performing assets is one-to-one translated 
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into a LLP. 
Overall, the results indicate that certain U.S. banks managed their earnings 
during the 2008 Financial Crisis. Hence, the study confirms the concerns of 
several stakeholders. Specifically, the results on Level 3 income support 
arguments that the use of fair values in non-active markets is problematic. 
However, we neither accuse fair value accounting of having exacerbated the 
crisis nor provide arguments against the measurement principle “fair value” per 
se. Rather, we caution against a blind trust in accounting numbers that are based 
on subjective assumptions.  
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539 100% 2,695 100%
./. Missing data in Thomson Reuters (618)
./. Banks that are not covered by Compustat (40)
= Sample for the tests of loan loss provisions 421 78% 2,037 76%
./. Missing fair value data in 10-Q and 10-K reports (128)
./. Observations without Level 3 positions (311)
./. Missing Call Reports in Bank Regulatory database (383)
= Sample for the tests of Level 3 income 329 61% 1,215 45%
U.S. banks in database Thomson Reuters
This table outlines the sample selection process. The sample banks are initially identified from Thomson Reuters. We exclude: 618
bank-quarters due to missing data in Thomson Reuters and 40 bank-quarters due to missing data on non-performing assets (i.e., 32
banks in the Thomson Reuters sample are either not covered by Compustat or data on non-performing assets is missing in
Compustat). For the tests of Level 3 fair value income, we require banks to have non-zero Level 3 balance-sheet positions, and thus,
exclude 311 bank-quarters. We exclude: 128 bank-quarters due to missing data on fair values in the 10-Q and 10-K reports; and 383
observations due to missing Call Reports in the database Bank Regulatory Holding Companies.




         
Panel A: Summary Statistics for Level 3 Income (L3INC ) and Level 3 OCI (L3OCI )
Variable N Mean p1 p25 Median p75 p99 Std. dev.
L3INC 1,215 -0.012 -0.194 -0.010 -0.001 0.000 0.025 0.040
L3OCI 1,215 -0.003 -0.072 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.017
Controls
SIZE 1,215 7.841 5.332 6.741 7.547 8.565 13.320 1.604
LEV 1,215 0.907 0.825 0.895 0.910 0.924 0.949 0.025
NPA 1,215 0.014 0.000 0.005 0.010 0.019 0.065 0.014
MBS_HTM 1,215 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.097 0.021
MBS_AFS 1,215 0.079 0.000 0.020 0.068 0.116 0.317 0.071
MBS_HFT 1,215 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.004
FVA3 1,215 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.071 0.017
FVL3 1,215 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.004
NR_FVA3 1,215 0.012 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.013 0.074 0.037
TRANSFERS 1,215 0.001 -0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.006
Panel B: Summary Statistics for Loan Loss Provision (LLP) 
Variable N Mean p1 p25 Median p75 p99 Std. dev.
LLP 2,037 -0.022 -0.169 -0.026 -0.011 -0.004 0.000 0.034
Controls
SIZE 2,037 7.475 5.208 6.448 7.138 8.088 12.415 1.489
LEV 2,037 0.899 0.738 0.890 0.907 0.923 0.949 0.041
NPA 2,037 0.012 0.000 0.004 0.009 0.016 0.061 0.013
ΔNPA 2,037 0.003 -0.009 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.024 0.006
ΔLOANS 2,037 0.015 -0.033 -0.002 0.010 0.021 0.190 0.048
LOANS 2,037 0.710 0.291 0.655 0.730 0.799 0.912 0.127
Panel A reports descriptive statistics of the regression variables for the L3INC sample. We define L3INC (L3OCI ) as unrealized Level 3 gains
or losses recognized in the income statement (other comprehensive income) scaled by lagged equity. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total
assets. LEV is the debt-to-assets ratio. NPA are non-performing assets. MBS_HTM , MBS_AFS , and MBS_HFT are mortgage-backed
securities classified as held-to-maturity, available-for-sale, and trading, respectively. FVA3 and FVL3 are recurring Level 3 assets and
liabilities, respectively. NR_FVA3 are non-recurring Level 3 assets. TRANSFERS denotes net transfers of assets and liabilities into or out of
the Level 3 category. All balance sheet variables are both scaled by total assets and measured at the beginning of the quarter.
Panel B reports descriptive statistics of the regression variables for the LLP sample. We define LLP as loan loss provisions recognized in the
income statement (i.e., negative amounts represent expenses and thus have a negative impact on earnings) scaled by lagged equity. Δ NPA  is 
the change in NPA from the previous to the current quarter. LOANS are gross loans before loan loss allowances. ΔLOANS is the change in
LOANS from the previous to the current quarter. All balance sheet variables are both scaled by total assets and measured at the beginning of
the quarter.
  46 
TABLE 3 
Pearson correlation coefficients 
 
  
Panel A: Correlation Coefficients for L3INC  and L3OCI
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
[1] L3INC 1
[2] L3OCI 0.001 1
[3] SIZE -0.075*** 0.014 1
[4] LEV 0.018 -0.133*** -0.073** 1
[5] NPA -0.183*** 0.004 -0.136*** 0.105*** 1
[6] MBS_HTM 0.019 -0.025 0.060** 0.066** -0.107*** 1
[7] MBS_AFS 0.045 -0.048* 0.233*** 0.117*** -0.140*** 0.134*** 1
[8] MBS_HFT -0.129*** 0.010 0.321*** 0.085*** 0.044 -0.042 0.002 1
[9] FVA3 -0.062** -0.263*** 0.282*** 0.083*** -0.029 0.050* 0.090*** 0.235*** 1
[10] FVL3 -0.088*** 0.029 0.226*** 0.066** 0.103*** -0.004 -0.016 0.560*** 0.266*** 1
[11] NR_FVA3 -0.087*** -0.004 -0.088*** 0.004 0.210*** -0.053* -0.088*** 0.012 -0.038 0.015 1
[12] TRANSFERS -0.069** -0.026 0.041 0.065** 0.003 0.110*** 0.076*** 0.086*** 0.396*** 0.019 -0.021 1
Panel B: Correlation Coefficients for LLP
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
[1] LLP 1
[2] SIZE -0.204*** 1
[3] LEV -0.236*** 0.102*** 1
[4] NPA -0.420*** -0.029 0.141*** 1
[5] ΔNPA -0.295*** 0.002 0.0571** 0.235*** 1
[6] ΔLOANS 0.050** -0.013 -0.078*** -0.157*** 0.025 1
[7] LOANS -0.154*** -0.209 0.121 0.266*** 0.192*** 0.018 1
Panel A reports Pearson correlation coefficients between independent regression variables and the dependent variables L3INC and L3OCI . Panel B of the table
shows Pearson correlation coefficients for the dependent variable LLP . See Table 2 for the definition of the variables. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively.
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TABLE 4 





Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept -0.505 -0.054 0.066 0.061 * 0.165 0.139 ***
 (-1.32)  (-0.55) (0.68) (1.70) (1.07) (5.89)
SIZE -0.020 -0.002 *** 0.008 0.001 * 0.006 -0.005 ***
 (-0.93)  (-2.69) (0.74) (1.79) (0.29)  (-6.68)
LEV 0.655 0.070 -0.126 -0.072 * -0.158 -0.112 ***
(1.35) (0.68)  (-1.56)  (-1.84)  (-0.64)  (-4.11)
NPA -0.349 -0.479 *** 0.004 0.005 -0.947 *** -0.853 ***
 (-1.23)  (-3.76) (0.04) (0.09)  (-4.81)  (-7.35)
ΔNPA -0.932 *** -1.026 ***
 (-4.44)  (-5.70)
ΔLOANS -0.006 -0.008
 (-0.21)  (-0.39)
LOANS -0.073 -0.012
 (-1.37)  (-1.59)
MBS_HTM -0.079 0.008 0.167 -0.012
 (-0.83) (0.27) (0.95)  (-0.43)
MBS_AFS 0.099 0.021 -0.014 -0.007
(1.64) (1.35)  (-0.47)  (-0.94)
MBS_HFT 1.086 -0.932 * 0.485 0.038
(0.74)  (-1.85) (1.58) (0.24)
FVA3 0.019 -0.037 0.113 -0.355 **
(0.21)  (-0.62) (0.56)  (-2.34)
FVL3 -0.669 -0.090 0.103 0.409 ***
 (-0.84)  (-0.20) (0.22) (2.63)
NR_FVA3 -0.032 -0.058 -0.009 -0.005
 (-1.27)  (-1.32)  (-0.80)  (-0.80)
TRANSFERS -0.480 -0.375 0.053 0.331
 (-1.24)  (-1.17) (0.13) (1.25)
Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sub-industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes No
R2 0.409 0.072 0.563 0.112 0.579 0.323
F-statistic NA 2.93 *** NA 3.01 *** NA 30.29 ***
N 1,215 1,215 1,215 1,215 2,037 2,037
Panel B: Summary statistics for estimated discretionary components
Variable N Mean p1 p25 Median p75 p99 Std. dev.
DL3INC 1215 0.000 -0.179 -0.002 0.005 0.012 0.043 0.038
Dl3INC_FE 1215 0.000 -0.132 -0.005 0.000 0.008 0.079 0.030
DL3OCI 1215 0.000 -0.057 -0.001 0.001 0.004 0.032 0.016
DL3OCI_FE 1215 0.000 -0.037 -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.032 0.011
DLLP 2037 0.000 -0.115 -0.005 0.004 0.012 0.041 0.028
DLLP_FE 2037 0.000 -0.075 -0.005 0.000 0.008 0.049 0.022
NI 1215 0.000 -0.308 0.002 0.015 0.024 0.072 0.067
NI 2037 0.003 -0.286 0.003 0.014 0.024 0.063 0.059
NIBDL3INC 1215 0.000 -0.272 -0.008 0.010 0.024 0.097 0.064
NIBDL3INC_FE 1215 0.000 -0.277 -0.007 0.013 0.026 0.086 0.065
NIBDLLP 2037 0.003 -0.248 -0.003 0.011 0.022 0.066 0.058







Panel A reports OLS coefficient estimates and, in parentheses, t -statistics based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by
bank (Rogers, 1993). In models (1) and (2), L3INC is the dependent variable; in model (3) and (4), L3OCI is the dependent variable; and in
models (5) and (6), LLP is the dependent variable. In models (1), (3), and (5), we include bank fixed effects. In all models, we include both
quarter fixed effects and sub-industry fixed effects. See Table 2 for the definition of the variables. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed).
Panel B reports the descriptive statitsitcs of the estimated discretionary components of L3INC , L3OCI and LLP ; reported net income scaled by
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TABLE 5 
Discretionary income across earnings management incentives 
 
(continued on next page)  
Panel A: Mean discretionary Level 3 income, Level 3 OCI, and LLP
Premanaged earnings and capital N DL3INC DL3OCI N DLLP
Incentive I: Net income before DL3INC (DLLP) below 25th percentile 276 0.0108 0.0007 275 0.0032
Control I: Net income before DL3INC  (DLLP) between median and 75th percentile 276 0.0017 -0.0001 276 0.0023
Difference 0.0090 *** 0.0008 0.0009
t -statistic (3.72) (0.61) (0.38)
Incentive II: Negative change in net income before DL3INC  (DLLP) 606 0.0049 0.0002 572 0.0029
Control II: Positive change in net income before DL3INC  (DLLP) 315 -0.0088 -0.0005 349 -0.0066
Difference 0.0137 *** 0.0007 0.0095 ***
t -statistic (4.87) (0.53) (4.05)
Incentive III: Small negative net income before DL3INC (DLLP) 134 0.0063 -0.0018 154 0.0073
Control III: Small positive net income before DL3INC  (DLLP) 204 0.0022 0.0013 232 0.0049
Difference 0.0040 -0.0030 * 0.0025
t -statisitic (0.84)  (-1.72) (1.31)
Incentive IV: Tier1 before DL3INC  (DLLP)  below 25th percentile 197 0.0078 -0.0003 197 0.0018
Control IV: Tier1 before DL3INC  (DLLP) between median and 75th percentile 198 0.0019 -0.0010 198 -0.0017
Difference 0.0059 ** 0.0008 0.0035
t -statistic (2.17) (0.39) (1.07)
Panel B: Mean discretionary Level 3 income, Level 3 OCI, and LLP estimated with firm fixed effects
Premanaged earnings and capital N DL3INC_FE DL3OCI_FE N DLLP_FE
Incentive I: Net income before DL3INC_FE (DLLP_FE) below 25th percentile 276 0.0093 0.0000 275 0.0054
Control I: Net income before DL3INC_FE  (DLLP_FE) between median and 75th 275 -0.0020 0.0003 276 -0.0009
Difference 0.0112 *** -0.0003 0.0064 ***
t -statistic (3.53)  (-0.35) (2.85)
Incentive II: Negative change in net income before DL3INC_FE  (DLLP_FE) 595 0.0047 0.0000 570 0.0033
Control II: Positive change in net income before DL3INC_FE  (DLLP_FE) 326 -0.0082 0.0001 351 -0.0061
Difference 0.0128 *** -0.0001 0.0094 ***
t -statistic (5.85)  (-0.12) (5.12)
Incentive III: Small negative net income before DL3INC_FE (DLLP_FE) 100 0.0055 -0.0001 103 0.0041
Control III: Small positive net income before DL3INC_FE  (DLLP_FE) 194 0.0025 -0.0003 213 0.0020
Difference 0.0029 0.0002 0.0021
t -statisitic (1.44) (0.17) (0.98)
Incentive IV: Tier1 before DL3INC_FE  (DLLP_FE)  below 25th percentile 198 0.0047 -0.0008 197 0.0037
Control IV: Tier1 before DL3INC_FE  (DLLP_FE) between median and 75th percentile 198 0.0009 0.0005 198 -0.0010
Difference 0.0038 -0.0013 0.0047 *
t -statistic (1.36)  (-1.20) (1.93)
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Premanaged earnings before full amount of  Level 3 income (LLP)
Premanaged earnings and capital N DL3INC DL3OCI DLLP
Incentive I: Net income before L3INC (LLP) below 25th percentile 276 0.0117 0.0004 276 0.0003
Control I: Net income before L3INC  (LLP) between median and 75th percentile 276 -0.0013 0.0004 276 0.0042
Difference 0.0130 *** 0.0001 -0.0039 *
t -statistic (3.98) (0.06)  (-1.81)
Incentive II: Negative change in net income before L3INC  (LLP) 533 0.0067 0.0000 465 0.0045
Control II: Positive change in net income before L3INC  (LLP) 388 -0.0088 -0.0001 456 -0.0061
Difference 0.0155 *** 0.0001 0.0106 ***
t -statistic (5.76) (0.10) (4.69)
Incentive III: Small negative net income before L3INC (LLP) 48 0.0103 0.0035 13 -0.0036
Control III: Small positive net income before L3INC  (LLP) 119 0.0095 -0.0018 25 0.0101
Difference 0.0008 0.0053 -0.0136
t -statisitic (0.19) (1.57)  (-1.54)
Incentive IV: Tier1 before L3INC  (LLP)  below 25th percentile 198 0.0061 -0.0005 197 0.0014
Control IV: Tier1 before L3INC  (LLP) between 2nd and 3rd Quartil 197 0.0014 -0.0011 198 -0.0024
Difference 0.0047 * 0.0006 0.0038
t -statistic (1.72) (0.33) (1.17)
Panel D: Premanaged earnings before both DL3INC  and DLLP
Premanaged earnings and capital N DL3INC DL3OCI N DLLP
Incentive I: Net income before both DL3INC and DLLP below 25th percentile 276 0.0135 0.0002 276 0.0059
Control I: Net income before both DL3INC  and DLLP between median and 75th 275 0.0014 0.0003 275 0.0029
Difference 0.0121 *** 0.0000 0.0029
t -statistic (6.20) (0.04) (1.44)
Incentive II: Negative change in net income before both DL3INC  and DLLP 586 0.0049 -0.0001 586 0.0027
Control II: Positive change in net income before both DL3INC  and DLLP 335 -0.0080 0.0001 335 -0.0067
Difference 0.0129 *** -0.0002 0.0095 ***
t -statistic (4.67)  (-0.15) (4.02)
Incentive III: Small negative net income before both DL3INC and DLLP 186 0.0065 0.0011 186 0.0043
Control III: Small positive net income before boh DL3INC  and DLLP 233 0.0020 0.0000 233 0.0033
Difference 0.0044 0.0011 0.0010
t -statisitic (1.36) (0.91) (0.52)
Incentive IV: Tier1 before both DL3INC  and DLLP  below 25th percentile 197 0.0092 -0.0004 197 0.0035
Control IV: Tier1 before both DL3INC  and DLLP between median and 75th percentile 198 0.0026 -0.0002 198 -0.0013
Difference 0.0066 *** -0.0002 0.0048
t -statistic (2.82)  (-0.09) (1.61)
This table presents the mean discretionary Level 3 gains or losses recognized in income (DL3INC ), discretionary Level 3 gains or losses recognized in OCI
(DL3OCI ), and discretionary loan loss provision (DLLP ) for banks with earnings management incentives (i.e., low premanaged earnings, negative change in
premanaged earnings, small negative premanaged earnings, and low premanaged tier 1 capital) and the respective control groups. Premanaged earnings is defined
as net income minus the discretionary components of L3INC (LLP ). Negative (positive) change in premanaged earnings is defined as current quarter premanaged
earnings being lower (higher) than previous quarter premanaged earnings. Small negative income is defined as net income before discretionary income between
zero and the negative value of four times the interquartile range over the cube root of the number of observations (Beatty et al. 2002). Premanaged Tier 1 capital is
regulatory Tier 1 capital minus discretionary Level 3 income (LLP). 
Panel A shows the mean values for DL3INC , DL3OCI, and DLLP estimated without firm fixed effects. Panel B shows the mean values for DL3INC_FE , DL3OCI_FE  
and DLLP_FE estimated with firm fixed effects. Panel C shows the results for DL3INC , DL3OCI and DLLP when premanaged earnings are measured before the full 
amount of Level 3 income and LLP, respectively (i. e., Level 3 income and LLP as reported). Panel D shows the results for DL3INC , DL3OCI , and DLLP when 
premanaged earnings are measured before both DL3INC and DLLP . ***, **, and * indicate that the means are significantly different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively, using a two-tailed t -test.
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TABLE 6 
Earnings management and the Lehman bankruptcy 
 
 
Premanaged earnings and capital N Pre Lehman Post Lehman Pre Lehman Post Lehman N Pre Lehman Post Lehman
Incentive I: Net income before DL3INC (DLLP) below 25th percentile 43, 233 0.0108 0.0107 0.0017 0.0005 39, 236 0.0102 0.0020
Control I: Net income before DL3INC  (DLLP) between median and 75th 124, 152 0.0025 0.0011 0.0003 -0.0004 128, 148 0.0047 0.0002
Difference 0.0083 ** 0.0097 *** 0.0014 * 0.0009 0.0055 ** 0.0019
t -statistic (2.23) (2.96) (1.72) (0.50) (2.02) (0.56)
Incentive II: Negative change in net income before DL3INC  (DLLP) 136, 470 0.0065 0.0044 -0.0001 0.0003 145, 427 0.0050 0.0021
Control II: Positive change in net income before DL3INC  (DLLP) 60, 255 -0.0142 -0.0076 0.0005 -0.0007 51, 298 -0.0100 -0.0060
Difference 0.0207 *** 0.0119 *** -0.0006 0.0010 0.0151 *** 0.0081 ***
t -statistic (3.21) (3.83)  (-0.44) (0.65) (4.09) (2.92)
Incentive III: Small negative net income before DL3INC (DLLP) 32, 102 0.0120 0.0045 -0.0021 -0.0017 236, 129 0.0020 0.0064
Control III: Small positive net income before DL3INC  (DLLP) 62, 142 -0.0032 0.0046 0.0001 0.0018 148, 156 0.0002 0.0046
Difference 0.0153 -0.0002 -0.0022 -0.0034 0.0019 0.0018
t -statisitic (1.19)  (-0.04)  (-0.84)  (-1.55) (0.56) (0.74)
Incentive IV: Tier1 before DL3INC  (DLLP)  below 25th percentile 62, 135 0.0089 0.0072 -0.0006 -0.0001 66, 131 0.0051 0.0001
Control IV: Tier1 before DL3INC  (DLLP) between median and 75th 33, 165 -0.0005 0.0023 0.0000 -0.0012 32, 166 -0.0050 -0.0011
Difference 0.0094 *** 0.0049 -0.0006 0.0011 0.0101 ** 0.0011
t -statistic (3.15) (1.41)  (-0.21) (0.46) (2.07) (0.28)
This table reports mean discretionary Level 3 gains or losses regognized in income (DL3INC ), discretionary Level 3 gains or losses recognized in OCI (DL3OCI ), and discretionary loan loss provision (DLLP ) before the Lehman collapse (i.e., first
and second quarter of 2008) and after the Lehman collpase (i.e., third and fourth quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009). Identical to Panel A of Table 4, DL3INC , DL3OCI , and DLLP are estimated without firm fixed effects, and premanaged
earnings is defined as net income before DL3INC  (DLLP ). ***, **, and *  indicate that the means are significantly different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test 
DL3INC DL3OCI DLLP
